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Corruption, Income Inequality, and Poverty in the United States 
 
Summary 
In this study we analyze the effects of corruption on income inequality and poverty. Our 
analysis advances the existing literature in four ways. First, instead of using corruption 
indices assembled by various investment risk services, we use an objective measure of 
corruption: the number of public officials convicted in a state for crimes related to 
corruption. Second, we use all commonly used inequality and poverty measures 
including various Atkinson indexes, Gini index, standard deviation of the logarithms, 
relative mean deviation, coefficient of variation, and the poverty rate defined by the 
U.S. Census Bureau. Third, we minimize the problems which are likely to arise due to 
data incomparability by examining the differences in income inequality, and poverty 
across U.S. states. Finally, we exploit both time series and cross sectional variation in 
the data. We find robust evidence that an increase in corruption increases income 
inequality and poverty. 
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Corruption, Income Inequality and Poverty in the United States 
 
1. Introduction 
An increasing number of empirical studies (e.g. Mauro 1995, Knack and Keefer 
1995, Knack 1996, Keefer and Knack 1997, Mo 2001, Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2004) 
present persuasive evidence regarding the detrimental effects of corruption on various 
economic variables such as the growth rate of income.  
Corruption does not only affect the growth rate of income but also affects income 
inequality and poverty. “The benefits from corruption are likely to accrue to the better 
connected individuals … who belong mostly to high income groups” (Gupta et. al. 2002, 
23).  According to Jonston (1989), corruption favors the ‘haves’ rather than the ‘have 
nots’ particularly if the stakes are large. The burden of corruption falls disproportionately 
on low income individuals. Individuals who belong to low income groups pay a higher 
proportion of their income than the individuals who belong to high income groups. As 
Tanzi (1998) argues, corruption distorts the redistributive role of government. Since only 
the better connected individuals get the most profitable government projects, it is less 
likely that the government is able to improve the distribution of income and make the 
economic system more equitable. It diverts government spending away from projects that 
benefit mostly low income individuals such as education and health to, for example, 
defense projects that create opportunities for corruption (Chetwyn et al. 2003). 
Nevertheless, there are only a few empirical studies (Li, Xu, and Zou 2000, Gupta et. al. 
2002, and Chong and Calderon 2000a and 2000b) analyzing the effects of corruption on 
income inequality and poverty. Using data from a mixed group of countries, i.e., low,   4 
middle, and high-income, Li, Xu, and Zou (2000) and Chong and Calderon (2000a) find 
an inverse U-shaped relationship between corruption and income inequality. They find a 
positive relationship between corruption and income inequality in high-income countries 
and a negative relationship in low-income countries. Gupta et al. (2002), on the other 
hand, using a smaller sample of countries, find a positive and linear relationship between 
corruption and income inequality. Chong and Calderon (2000b) and Gupta et al. (2002) 
both analyze the effects of corruption on poverty as well as on income inequality. As 
Chong and Calderon (2000b) argue, an increase in income inequality as corruption 
increases does not necessarily mean that poverty also increases. If, for example, the 
incomes in the higher end of the distribution grow faster than incomes in the lower end of 
the distribution, income inequality increases while poverty decreases. Both Chong and 
Calderon (2000b) and Gupta et al. (2002) find a positive and linear relationship between 
corruption and poverty. 
In this study, we analyze the effects of corruption on income inequality and 
poverty by using data from U.S. states. Using data from U.S. states is quite advantageous. 
The likelihood of the problems arising due to data incomparability is minimal. Data on 
corruption as well as on income inequality and poverty for U.S. states are more 
comparable than those for different countries, and U.S. states are more similar in other 
dimensions that are difficult to measure. We find robust evidence that an increase in 
corruption increases income inequality and poverty across U.S. states.  
Our analysis advances the existing literature in three ways. First, instead of using 
subjective cross-country corruption indices assembled by various investment risk 
services, we use an objective measure of corruption: the number of government officials   5 
convicted in a state for crimes related to corruption. Second, we employ all commonly 
used inequality and poverty measures including various Atkinson indexes, Gini index, 
standard deviation of the logarithms, relative mean deviation, coefficient of variation, and 
the poverty rate defined by the U.S. Census Bureau.  Finally, we exploit both time series 
and cross-sectional variation in the data.  
 
2. Data 
  We use annual data from 50 states for 17 years, from 1981 to 1997. For our 
measure of corruption (Corruption), we use the number of government officials 
convicted in a state for crimes related to corruption in a year. The data are from the 
Justice Department’s “Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public 
Integrity Section”. These data are used by several studies such as Goel and Rich (1989), 
Fisman and Gatti (2002), Fredriksson, List and Millimet (2003) and Glaeser and Saks 
(2006) to measure corruption across states. They cover a broad range of crimes from 
election fraud to wire fraud.   We deflate the number of convictions by state population. 
As Glaeser and Saks (2006) argue, using the number of convictions creates a problem 
since a smaller number of government officials are likely to be convicted in corrupt 
states. Following Glaeser and Saks (2006), to mitigate this problem, we focus on federal 
convictions.  
  We measure income inequality across states by using the four traditional 
measures Gini Index (Gini), standard deviation of the logarithms (SDL), relative mean 
deviation (RMD), and the coefficient of variation (CV) as well as the various Atkinson   6 
indexes (Ie) given by Wu, Golan, and Perloff (2006)
1. As mentioned by Wu, Golan, and 
Perloff (2006), all of these measures are scale free relative measures. Following Sen 
(1997), if we consider distributions of income over persons,  1,2,3,..., i n = , and let  i y  be 
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Atkinson index (I) is an inequality measure which is based on the concept of what 
Atkinson (1970) calls the equally distributed equivalent level of income.
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1 We wish to thank Ximing Wu, Jeffrey M. Perloff, and Amos Golan for making their data 
publicly available.   











3 See Atkinson (1970), Sen (1997), and Wu, Perloff, and Golan (2006a) for an excellent discussion 
of the Atkinson index as well as the traditional inequality measures.    7 
where, e  measures the degree of inequality aversion. It takes values ranging from 0 to 
. ¥  As e  increases the Atkinson index becomes more sensitive to changes at the lower 
end of the income distribution and as e  decreases it becomes more sensitive to changes 
at the higher end of the distribution. The index equals zero when distribution of income is 
equal and approaches 1 as inequality increases. We assume e  is equal to 0.5, 1, and 1.5.
4 
We measure poverty by the percentage of people whose income is under the poverty 
threshold given by the Census Bureau. In order to determine the number of people who 
are in poverty, the Census Bureau uses a set of income thresholds that vary by the size 
and the composition of the family. If a family’s total income is less than the family’s 
threshold, then every person belonging to that family is considered in poverty. The 
poverty thresholds are updated using the consumer price index.   
  Based on the averages across the 17 years, Texas has the highest inequality 
regardless of which inequality measure is used while Mississippi has the highest poverty.  
Vermont has the lowest inequality when SDL is used to measure inequality while 
Wisconsin has the lowest inequality when other measures are used. New Hampshire has 
the lowest poverty. Mississippi and Vermont are the most and the least corrupt states, 
respectively. The states with the three lowest and highest inequality and poverty as well 
those with the three lowest and highest corruption are given in Table 1. The summary 
statistics for all of the inequality measures, poverty, and corruption are given in Table 2. 
As expected, the correlations between the inequality measures, poverty, and 
corruption are positive: the correlation coefficients between corruption and the inequality 
measures are around 0.20 as is the correlation coefficient between corruption and 
                                                 
4 Atkinson (1970) assumes e lies within the range of (0, 2.5]. The index is given for 0.1, 0.5, 1, 
1.5, 2, and 2.5 by Wu, Perloff, and Golan (2006a). Nevertheless, to save space we do not report the results 
for 0.1, 2, and 2.5.   8 
poverty. Pairwise correlations of the inequality measures, poverty, and corruption are 
given in Table 3. 
We include a set of control variables in our regressions to minimize the omitted 
variable bias. First, following Wu, Perloff, and Golan (2006), we include a set of 
government policy variables: earned income tax credit benefit rate (EITCB), earned 
income tax credit phase-out rate (EITCP), and aid to the families with dependent 
children/temporary assistance to needy families (AFDC/TANF). The AFDC/TANF is the 
maximum monthly benefits for a single parent, three person family. EITCB is the product 
of the earned income tax credit rate and the maximum income required for maximum 
benefit. The earned income tax credit is phased out as a family's income rises. EITCP is 
the rate at which the earned income tax credit benefit is reduced over the phase-out range. 
The data are from Wu, Perloff, and Golan (2006). Second, we include two 
macroeconomic variables: real per capita personal income (Income) and the 
unemployment rate (Unemployment). The income data are from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) and the unemployment data are from Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 
As Glaeser (2005) argues, stronger unions generally mean increased equality. Hence we 
include the unionization rate (Union) as another control variable using the estimates 
provided by Hirsch, Macpherson, and Vroman (2001). Finally, we include education 
(Education) as our last control variable. We measure education as the share of secondary 
school enrolment in the population. The data are from National Center for Education 
Statistics. 
 
   9 
3. Results 
 
Corruption and income inequality 
To analyze the relationship between corruption and income inequality, we 
estimate the following basic model by ordinary least squares (OLS) controlling for time 
and region fixed effects: 
  st st st t s st Inequality Corruption X T R u a b g m f = + × + × + × + × +  
where  st Inequality  represents each of our measures of income inequality in state s during 
period t.  st Corruption  represents corruption whereas Xst represents the set of control 
variables that affect income inequality (EITCB, EITCP, AFDC/TANF, Education, 
Income, Unemployment, Union),  t T  represents the set of year dummies,  s R  represents the 
set of region dummies and  st u  represents the error term. The results of OLS estimation 
are given in Table 4. The R
2 ranges from 0.46 to 0.64.  In all regressions, the estimated 
coefficient of corruption is positive and highly significant indicating that corruption 
increases income inequality. One standard deviation increase in Corruption increases 
Gini, for example, by 0.3 percentage points, the same increase in Gini due to a 20 percent 
decrease in AFDC/TANF. Up to 6 percent of the difference in Gini index between the 
least corrupt state Vermont and the most corrupt state Mississippi is explained by 
different corruption levels in those states. Similarly, one standard deviation increase in 
Corruption increases SDL by 0.6 percentage points, RMD by 0.5 percentage points, and 
CV by 1.4 percentage points.  
As mentioned earlier, ase  increases, the Atkinson index becomes more sensitive 
to changes at the lower end of the income distribution. The estimated coefficient of   10 
Corruption increases as e  increases, indicating that effects of corruption on the lower 
end of the distribution are higher. One standard deviation increase in Corruption 
increases Ie=0.5, Ie=1, and Ie=1.5, by 0.2, 0.4, and 0.6 percentage points, respectively.  
Our results about the effects of macroeconomic and demographic control 
variables on income inequality are mostly consistent with the earlier studies. The 
estimated coefficients of Unemployment, Income, Education, and Union are significant in 
all estimations. We find that education and unionization have an equalizing effect while 
unemployment rate tends to increase income inequality as expected (Li et. al. 2000, 
Gupta et. al. 2002, Glaeser 2005, Wu, Perloff, and Golan 2006).  According to our 
estimations, an increase in real per capita income increases income inequality. Regarding 
the government policy variables, the estimated coefficients of EITCB, EITCP, 
AFDC/TANF are significant in all estimations. Again, as expected, while the estimated 
coefficient of EITCP is positive, the estimated coefficients of both EITCB and 
AFDC/TANF are negative (Wu, Perloff, and Golan 2006). 
 
Corruption and poverty 
In our poverty regressions we control for Income, Education, Unemployment, 
region and year dummies, as well as inequality (Gini, SDL, RMD, CV, AI). The results of 
the OLS estimation are given in Table 5.
5 We first estimate a poverty regression without 
controlling for inequality. The R
2 is 0.67. The estimated coefficient of corruption is 
positive and significant indicating that corruption increases poverty. One standard 
deviation increase in Corruption increases Poverty by 0.5 percentage points, the same 
                                                 
5 In the second column we give the results of the regression in which we measure inequality by 
Gini, third by SDL, fourth by RMD, fifth by CV, sixth by Ie=0.5, seventh by Ie=1, and eighth by Ie=1.5.    11 
increase in Poverty due to a 10 percent increase in Unemployment. Up to 7 percent of the 
difference in Poverty between Vermont and Mississippi is explained by different 
corruption levels in those states. According to Ravallion (1997), income inequality 
matters for poverty reduction. It is then quite likely that corruption affect poverty both 
directly and indirectly through income inequality. In our regressions the coefficient of the 
income inequality regardless of the measure we use is positive and highly significant 
which is consistent with Chong and Calderon (2000b). When we include income 
inequality in our poverty regressions the R
2 increases significantly. It ranges from 0.74 to 
0.82. In all regressions, the estimated coefficient of corruption is positive and highly 
significant. Nevertheless the coefficient estimate decreases when we include inequality 
indicating that corruption has indeed direct effects on poverty as well as indirect effects 
through income inequality. Regarding the other control variables, we find a positive 
relationship between Unemployment and Poverty and consistent with both Chong and 
Calderon (2000b) and Gupta et al. (2002) a negative relationship between Income and 
Poverty. According to our estimations, there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between 
Education and Poverty. 
 
4. Robustness of the Results 
  The main robustness issue is whether the results are due to reverse causality. As 
You and Khagram (2005), Uslaner (2006), and Chong and Gradstein (2007) argue, high 
income inequality and high poverty are likely to lead to more corruption. Instrumental 
variables (IV) estimation helps address this problem. The choice of the instrument is 
extremely important. A good instrument is a variable that is supposed to be uncorrelated   12 
with the error term but correlated with the endogenous variable Corruption. Previous 
studies such as Mauro (1995) use instruments such as ethnic fractionalization index 
(EFI). The index is calculated as 
1 1
P
s sp p EFI n
= = -∑ , 
where  sp n  is the population share of group p in country s. EFI gives us the probability 
that two randomly selected individuals in a country belong to two different ethnic groups. 
It reaches a maximum if every individual in a country belongs to a different ethnic or 
religious group. In our regressions we use both ethnic and religious fractionalization 
indexes as our instruments. The data we use to calculate the EFI are from the Census 
Bureau for 1970, which cover five ethnic groups: Whites, Blacks, American Indian and 
Eskimos, Asians, and Others. The data we use to calculate the religious fractionalization 
index (RFI) are from the American Religion Data Archive for the same year. These data 
are collected by representatives of the Association of Statisticians of American Religious 
Bodies to provide information on the number of churches and members for 53 Judeo-
Christian church bodies for 1971 representing an estimated 81 percent of church 
membership in the United States. The results of the IV estimation for the inequality 
regressions are given in Table 6, and for the poverty regressions in Table 7. The 
estimated coefficient of corruption is positive and highly significant in all regressions 
indicating that our results are robust to reverse causality. As long as the ethnic and 
religious fractionalization indexes affect income inequality and poverty through 
Corruption, the instruments are theoretically valid. According to the 1
st stage F and the 
Hansen J statistics given in Table 6 and Table 7, they are empirically valid as well.
  The second robustness issue is the possible measurement error in Corruption.   13 
Nevertheless, IV estimation does not only help correct for reverse causality but also the 
measurement error. 
The third robustness issue is the presence of spatial autocorrelation. Income 
inequality and poverty in a state is likely to be affected by income inequality and poverty 
in neighboring states. Ignoring spatial autocorrelation in income inequality and poverty 
causes biased estimates. To control for spatial autocorrelation, we estimate the following 
spatial autoregressive (i.e., spatial lag) model by maximum likelihood (ML): 
 
( ) ( ) st st st st st st
t s st
Inequality Poverty Corruption X W Inequality Poverty
T R u
a b g r
m f
= + × + × + × ×
+ × + × +
 
 
where, W is the spatial-lag weighting matrix and r is the coefficient giving the sign and 
the strength of spatial autocorrelation in Inequality (Poverty). We adopt a simple 
weighting scheme of strict state contiguity, such that  1 if  ij w i j = ¹  and state i is 
contiguous to state j and  0 j w =  otherwise.  ( ) st st W Inequality Poverty ×  is nothing but the 
average income inequality (poverty) in state s’s neighboring states at time t. The results 
of the ML estimation are given in Tables 8 and 10. Spatial autocorrelation is present in 
some poverty regressions and in all inequality regressions. The coefficient estimates are 
virtually the same as the ones estimated by OLS. We estimate our spatial autoregressive 
model of inequality and poverty by instrumenting Corruption with ethnic and religious 
fractionalization indexes for 1970 and 1971 as well. The results are given in Tables 9 and 
11. The estimated coefficients of Corruption are again positive and significant in all 
regressions.   14 
  The fourth robustness issue is the presence of outliers. We estimate the 
regressions without the observations identified as outliers by Hadi’s methodology. The 
results are given in Tables 12 and 13. The estimated coefficient of Corruption remains 
positive and significant in all estimations. It increases slightly in all estimations. One 
standard deviation increase in Corruption increases Gini, for example, by 0.4 percentage 
points and Poverty by 0.6 percentage points when we exclude outliers. The partial 
regression plots between Corruption and our income inequality measures as well as 
Corruption and Poverty are given in Figures 1 through 8. 
  The fifth and the last robustness issue is the stationarity of our inequality and 
poverty measures. We use two commonly used unit root tests for panel data: Levin-Lin-
Chu (LLC) and Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS). Under the null hypothesis, both tests assume that 
all series in the panel are non-stationary. LLC test assumes that all series are stationary 
under the alternative hypothesis whereas IPS test assumes that only a fraction of the 
series in the panel is stationary. Using both tests we reject the null hypothesis of non-
stationarity of our inequality and poverty measures.     
 
5. Conclusion 
Corruption is not a phenomenon peculiar to low-income countries. It is possible to 
find examples of corruption in high-income countries as well. In Germany, for example, 
corruption led to an increase in cost of about 20 to 30 percent during the construction of 
terminal 2 at Frankfort Airport. In Italy, the cost of major construction projects fell 
significantly in the aftermath of corruption investigations in the early 1990s (Rose-
Ackerman 1999). It is not a new phenomenon either. Prior to the New Deal, welfare   15 
programs in the U.S. were administered by local governments which were almost always 
associated with corruption. In 1933, when unemployment reached 25 percent, the federal 
government introduced welfare programs which redistributed 4 percent of the gross 
national product to millions of families. Knowing that he would incur enormous losses if 
the New Deal were perceived as corrupt, President Roosevelt took the fight against 
corruption in the administration of welfare programs very seriously by establishing 
offices to investigate complaints of corruption which led to vigorous prosecution of 
corrupt government officers (Wallis, Fishback, and Kantor 2006).  
In this study, we analyze the effects of corruption on income inequality and 
poverty by using data from U.S. states. To our knowledge, this is in fact the first study 
using data from U.S. states. Where previous analyses relied on cross-sectional variation 
in cross-country data, our analysis is less sensitive to bias due to unobserved country-
specific heterogeneity. Of course, data on our variables of interest - corruption, income 
inequality and poverty – as well as on control variables such as AFDC/TANF, are more 
comparable across U.S. states than those across different countries.  We find robust 
evidence that an increase in corruption increases income inequality and poverty. One 
standard deviation increase in corruption increases Gini index by 0.3 percentage points, 
the standard deviation of the logarithms by 0.6 percentage points, the relative mean 
deviation by 0.5 percentage points, the coefficient of variation by 1.4 percentage points, 
and poverty by 0.5 percentage points. 
Using Atkinson indexes with different degrees of inequality aversion helps us see 
if the effects of corruption on the lower end of the distribution differ from the effects on 
the higher end. We find that the coefficient estimate of corruption increases as the degree   16 
of inequality aversion increases, indicating that effects of corruption on the lower end of 
the distribution are higher. One standard deviation increase in corruption increases the 
Atkinson indexes by 0.2, 0.4, and 0.6 percentage points for the degrees of inequality 



















   17 
Bibliography 
Atkinson, A.B. (1970) “On the Measurement of Inequality,” Journal of Economic Theory  
2: 244-263 
Chetwyn, E., Chetwyn, F., and Spector, B. (2003) “Corruption and Poverty: A Review of  
Recent Literature,” Mimeo, Management Systems International, Washington DC. 
Chong, A. and Calderon, C. (2000a) “Institutional Quality and Income Distribution,”  
Economic Development and Cultural Change 48: 761-786   
Chong, A. and Calderon, C. (2000b) “Institutional Quality and Poverty Measures in a  
Cross-Section of Countries,” Economics of Governance 1: 123-135. 
Chong, A. and Gradstein, M. (2007) “Inequality and Institutions,” Review of Economics  
and Statistics 89: 454-465. 
Fisman, R. and Gatti, R. (2002) “Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence from   U.S. 
Federal Transfer Programs,” Public Choice 113: 25-35. 
Fredriksson, P. G., List, J. A. and Millimet, D. L. (2003) “Bureaucratic Corruption, 
  Environmental Policy and Inbound US FDI: Theory and Evidence,” Journal of 
  Public Economics 87: 1407-1430 
Glaeser, E. L. and Saks, R. E. (2006) “Corruption in America,” Journal of Public  
Economics  90: 1053-1072. 
Glaeser, E.L. (2005) “Inequality” HIER Discussion Paper 2078. 
Goel, R. and Rich, D. (1989) “On the Economic Incentives for Taking Bribes,” Public 
  Choice 61: 269-275. 
Gupta, S., Davoodi, H. and Alonso-Terme, R. (2002) “Does Corruption Affect Income  
Inequality and Poverty?” Economics of Governance 3: 23-45.   18 
Hirsch, B. T., Macpherson, D. A., and Vroman, W. G. (2001) “Estimates of union  
Density by State,” Monthly Labor Review 124: 51-55. 
Johnston, M. (1989) “Corruption, Inequality, and Change,” in P. M. Ward (Ed.), 
  Corruption, Development and Inequality, London: Routledge: 13-37 
Keefer, P. and Knack, S. (1997) “Why Don’t Poor Countries Catch Up? A Cross- 
National Test of An Institutional Explanation,” Economic Inquiry 35: 590-602. 
Knack, S. (1996) “Institutions and Convergence Hypothesis: The Cross-National  
Evidence,” Public Choice 87: 207-228. 
Knack, S. and Keefer, P. (1995) “Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country  
Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures,” Economics and Politics 7: 207- 
227. 
Li, H., Xu, L.C. and Zou, H. F. (2000) “Corruption, Income Distribution, and Growth,” 
  Economics and Politics 12: 155-182. 
Mauro, P. (1995) “Corruption and Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 110: 681- 
812 
Mo, P. H. (2001) “Corruption and Economic Growth,” Journal of Comparative  
Economics 29: 66-79 
Pellegrini, L. and Gerlagh, R. (2004) “Corruption’s Effect on Growth and its 
  Transmission Channels,” Kyklos 57:429-456. 
Ravallion, M. (1997) “Can High-Inequality Developing Countries Escape Absolute  
Poverty?” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 1775. 
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999) Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and  
Reform, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   19 
Sen, A. (1997) On Economic Inequality, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Tanzi, V. (1998) “Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and  
Cures,” IMF Staff Papers, 45: 559-594. 
Uslaner, E. (2006) “Corruption and Inequality,” UNU-WIDER Research Paper 34. 
Wallis, J. J., Fishback, P. V., and Kantor, S. (2006) “Politics, Relief, and Reform:  
Roosevelt’s Efforts to Control Corruption and Political Manipulation during the 
New Deal,” in E. L. Glaeser and C. Goldin (Ed.), Corruption and Reform: 
Lessons from America’s Economic History, Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press: 343-372.  
Wu, X., Perloff, J. M., and  Golan, A. (2006a) “Effects of Government Policies on   
Income Distribution and Welfare,” Mimeo, Department of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics, UC Berkeley. 
You, J. and Khagram, S. (2005) “A Comparative Study of Inequality and Corruption,”  










   20 
Table 1. Worst and Best Three States 
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850  0.67  0.11  0.48  1.60 
RMD 
 
850  0.48  0.05  0.36  0.64 
CV 
 
850  0.55  0.12  0.28  1.01 
Ie e e e=0.050 
 
850  0.09  0.02  0.05  0.17 
Ie e e e=0.100 
 
850  0.19  0.03  0.11  0.31 
Ie e e e=0.150 
 
850  0.29  0.05  0.17  0.46 
Poverty 
 
850  0.14  0.04  0.02  0.27 
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Table 3.  Pairwise Correlations of the Inequality Measures, Poverty Rate, and Corruption 
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SDL 
 
0.86  1.00               
RMD 
 
0.99  0.82  1.00             
CV 
 
0.91  0.69  0.91  1.00           
Ie e e e=0.50 
 
0.99  0.89  0.98  0.92  1.00         
Ie e e e=0.100 
 
0.98  0.82  0.98  0.97  0.99  1.00       
Ie e e e=0.150 
 
0.93  0.74  0.93  0.99  0.95  0.98  1.00     
Poverty  
 
0.56  0.31  0.60  0.59  0.54  0.58  0.58  1.00   
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Table 4. Inequality and Corruption : OLS Estimation 
Dependent Variables: Gini, SDL, RMD, CV, and Atkinson Indices 
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Time/Region 
Dummies 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  850  850  850  850  850  850  850 
Adj. R-squared  0.61  0.64  0.59  0.46  0.60  0.56  0.50 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%       
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Table 5.  Poverty and Corruption: OLS Estimation 
Dependent Variable: Poverty 
 











Ie e e e=0.5 
 
AIe e e e=1 
 
AIe e e e=1.5 










                 
Inequality    0.718  0.156  0.476  0.158  1.216  0.644  0.406 








                 










                 
Education










                 










                 










                 
Constant  0.075  -0.096  -0.009  -0.073  0.072  0.029  0.036  0.043 
  (0.042)
*  (0.034)
***  (0.041)  (0.034)
**  (0.033)
**  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.033) 
                 
Time/Region  
Dummies 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  850  850  850  850  850  850  850  850 
R-squared  0.67  0.81  0.74  0.82  0.80  0.80  0.80  0.79 
Robust standard errors in parentheses               
* significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%           
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Table 6.  Inequality and Corruption: IV Estimation  
Dependent Variables: Gini, SDL, RMD, CV, and Atkinson Indices 
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Time/Region 
Dummies 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  850  850  850  850  850  850  850 
1

















c c c c















Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%       
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Table 7.  Poverty and Corruption : IV Estimation  
Dependent Variable: Poverty 









Ie e e e=0.5 
 
Ie e e e=1 
 
Ie e e e=1.5 










                 
Inequality    0.625  0.127  0.417  0.132  1.050  0.553  0.366 








                 
Education  2.621  2.924  2.973  2.727  2.457  2.811  2.589  2.369 
  (2.166)  (1.343)
**  (1.774)  (1.317)
**  (1.452)  (1.351)
**  (1.329)
**  (1.436) 
                 
Education










                 










                 










                 
Constant  0.167  -0.033  0.076  -0.016  0.123  0.079  0.085  0.099 
  (0.075)
**  (0.045)  (0.063)
**  (0.044)  (0.049)
***  (0.045)  (0.044)  (0.049)
** 
                 
Time/RegionDummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  850  850  850  850  850  850  850  850 
1



















c c c c

















Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%             27 
 
Table 8.  Inequality and Corruption: Spatial Autoregressive Estimation  
Dependent Variables: Gini, SDL, RMD, CV, Atkinson Indices 
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Time/Region 
Dummies 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  850  850  850  850  850  850  850 
Wald Test of r r r r 
























LM Test of r r r r 
























Log Likelihood  2140.739  1123.972  1778.999  872.062  2600.365  2040.098  1672.099 
  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%         
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Table 9.  Inequality and Corruption: Spatial Autoregressive Model 
    (Corruption instrumented by ethnic and religious fractionalization indices for 1970 and 1971) 
Dependent Variables: Gini, SDL, RMD, CV, Atkinson Indices 
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Time/Region 
Dummies 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  850  850  850  850  850  850  850 
Wald Test of r r r r 
























LM Test of r r r r 
























Log Likelihood  2169.892  1139.838  1809.594  897.389  2627.865  2068.465  1696.615 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%       
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Table 10.  Poverty and Corruption: Spatial Autoregressive Estimation 
Dependent Variable: Poverty 









Ie e e e=0.5 
 
Ie e e e=1 
 
Ie e e e=1.5 










                 
Inequality    0.729  0.145  0.484  0.156  1.224  0.647  0.399 








                 










                 
Education










                 










                 










                 
Constant  0.023  -0.093  -0.029  -0.069  0.065  0.031  0.038  0.036 
  (0.042)  (0.034)
***  (0.039)  (0.034)
**  (0.034)
*  (0.033)  (0.032)  (0.033) 
                 
Time/Region 
Dummies 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  850  850  850  850  850  850  850  850 
Wald Test of r r r r 



























LM Test of r r r r 



























Log Likelihood  1991.452  2197.588  2067.939  2205.517  2170.653  2186.210  2197.126  2172.677 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
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Table 11.  Poverty and Corruption: Spatial Autoregressive Estimation 
    (Corruption instrumented by ethnic and religious fractionalization indices for 1970 and 1971) 
Dependent Variable: Poverty 









Ie e e e=0.5 
 
Ie e e e=1 
 
Ie e e e=1.5 










                 
Inequality    0.712  0.137  0.474  0.151  1.192  0.632  0.389 








                 










                 
Education










                 










                 










                 
Constant  0.083  -0.067  0.019  -0.046  0.092  0.058  0.062  0.065 
  (0.042)
**  (0.034)
*  (0.040)  (0.035)  (0.034)
***  (0.033)
*  (0.033)
*  (0.033) 
                 
Time/Region 
Dummies 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  850  850  850  850  850  850  850  850 
Wald Test of r r r r 



























LM Test of r r r r 



























Log Likelihood  2008.143  2197.784  2076.478  2204.985  2173.162  2187.063  2197.962  2175.531 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%       







   31 
Table 12. Inequality and Corruption : OLS Estimation (No Outliers) 
Dependent Variables: Gini, SDL, RMD, CV, Atkinson Indices 
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Time/Region 
Dummies 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  837  837  837  836  837  837  836 
Adj. R-squared  0.62  0.71  0.61  0.48  0.62  0.58  0.52 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%       
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Table 13.  Poverty and Corruption: OLS Estimation (Outliers Excluded) 
Dependent Variable: Poverty 









Ie e e e=0.5 
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Ie e e e=1.5 










                 
Inequality    0.714  0.154  0.473  0.158  1.209  0.642  0.406 








                 










                 
Education










                 










                 










                 
Constant  0.062  -0.101  -0.018  -0.078  0.058  0.022  0.027  0.029 
  (0.043)  (0.034)
***  (0.041)  (0.034)
**  (0.033)
*  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.033) 
                 
Time/Region  
Dummies 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  837  837  837  837  837  837  837  837 
R-squared  0.67  0.81  0.74  0.81  0.80  0.80  0.81  0.80 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%           
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Figure 3. Partial Regression Plot 
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Figure 4. Partial Regression Plot 
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